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Taking the Employer's Gun and Bargaining About 
Returning It: A Reply to "A Law, Economics, and 
Negotiations Approach" to Striker Replacement 
Law 
WILLIAM R. CORBETI• 
"You just shot an unarmed man. " 
"Well, he should've anned himself .... nl 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF STRIKER REPLACEMENT LAW 
Since 1938, the law governing replacement of striking employees has 
permitted employers to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers. 
This rule, known as the Mackay doctrine,2 is one of the most vehemently 
debated of all labor law principles. 3 Opponents of the Mackay doctrine argue 
that it renders the statutory right to strike ineffective because striking 
employees' jobs are placed injeopardy.4 The Workplace Fairness Act,5 which 
died as a result of a Republican-led filibuster and the failure of efforts to invoke 
cloture in the United States Senate in July 1994,6 was the latest failed attempt 
to overturn Mackay legislatively. Other proposed legislation to overturn or 
·�iate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.S., Auburn 
University; J.D., The University of Alabama School of Law. I thank James W. Bowers, 
John M. Chu rch, John Devlin, Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., J. Fredric Ingram, and Sue A. 
Willis for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also thank Deborah 
Berthelot and Jonathan Pierce for their research assistance. This Article was w ritten with the 
support of a research grant from the L.S.U. Law Center. 
1 UNroRGIVEN (Warner Bros. 1992). 
2 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
3 See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Omtract and the 
Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 393 (1984) ("[F]ew rules of 
American labor law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent strike 
replacements."). 
4 See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economi.c 
Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 547, 574 ("[Mackay] has taken on a life of its own, ultimately 
to eclipse the statutory right it was intended to balance."); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: 
Tum It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. R.Ev. 295, 300 (1991) (asserting that Mackay "makes 
a mockery of the supposed right to strike"). 
5 S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House version was the Cesar Chavez 
Workplace Fairness Act, H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
6 Defeal of Striker Replacement Bill a Victory for Business Coalition, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 133 (July 14, 1994). 
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modify Mackay has been considered by Congress every year since 1988.7 
. With the defeat of the Workplace Fairness Act and the election of a 
Republican majority to both houses of Congress in November 1994, it 
appeared that no modification of striker replacement law was likely in the 
immediate future. This is an area of the law, however, in which organized 
labor is tenaciously committed to reform and in which business is perhaps 
equally committed to preserving the status quo. Unable to have legislation 
passed to prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements, organized labor won a 
smaller victory on a different front. 
On March 8, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,954, 
"Ensuring the Economical and Efficient Administration and Completion of 
Federal Government Contracts. "8 The Executive Order states that the policy of 
7 See William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Proc.edural Lirri.tations on Hiring Permanent 
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Ad, 72 N.C. 
L. REV. 813, 827 n.74 (1994). 
8 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). President Clinton's up-and­
down relationship with organized labor has been closely tied to his position on, and efforts 
relating to, the striker replacement ismie. It might be said that Executive Order 12,954 is an 
effort to honor commitments Mr. Clinton made to organized labor as a presidential 
candidate and as President. The legislative overturning of Mackay was a significant ismie in 
the 1992 presidential campaign. On April 8, 1992, Governor Clinton, then the front-runner 
for the Democratic nomination, appeared on the picket lines in Peoria, Illinois at one of the 
most highly publicized strikes in recent times-the United Auto Workers' strike of 
Caterpillar-and announced his support of the strikers. Cynthia Todd, Qinton Backs 
Strikers' mghts, Sr. Looo POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 1992, at Al. Organized labor endorsed 
the Clinton candidacy. Less than one year after President Clinton took office, relations 
between the President and organized labor became strained. The President lobbied hard for 
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which labor opposed. After passage 
of NAFT A, many labor leaders expressed their disappointment in the President. See Labor 
Beraies Ointon over NAFI'A, Seems Cool Toward Recondliation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 222 (Nov. 19, 1993). Some labor leaders suggested that President Clinton's best 
opportunity to �e them would be to lobby as hard for passage of the Workplace 
Fairness Act as he had for NAFr A. See Organill!d Labor Launches New Ejforl for Passage 
of Striker Replacement Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51 (Mar. 17, 1994); UAW 
President Bieber Suggests Qinto n Rebui.ld Relations by Backing Striker Replacement Bill, 
Daily Lab . Rep. (BNA) No. 233 (Dec. 7, 1993). President Clinton reiterated his support for 
the Workplace Fairness Act. See, e.g. , Aide Reqffirms Qinton Support for Workplace 
Fairness Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 73 (Apr. 18, 1994). Indeed, Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich on occasions assured organiz.ed labor that the Clinton administration would 
obtain passage of the bill. Unions Must Make Labor Law Refo rm Issue in OJngressio nal 
Ele ctions, Donahue Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93 (May 17, 1994). As discussed 
above, the bill died in the Senate. Some labor leaders suggested that President Clinton did 
not work very bard to get the votes to break the filibuster in the Senate-certainly not as 
hard as he had worked for passage of NAFT A. See Health Care Battle likely to Unite 
Industry for Battle over Comprehensive Job Safety Bill, Daily Lab . Rep. (BNA) No. 29 
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the executive branch in procuring goods and services is that "contracting 
agencies shall not contract with employers that permanently replace lawfully 
striking employees. "9 The Order authorizes the Secretary of Labor10 to 
investigate federal contractors to determine whether they have permanently 
replaced lawful strikers. I I If the Secretary determines that a contractor has 
hired permanent replacements, then the Secretary may exercise either or both 
of the following options: find that it is appropriate to terminate existing 
contracts for convenience; and find that it is appropriate to debar the contractor 
from future contracts and renewal of existing contracts until resolution of the 
labor dispute. 12 
The business camp did not sit idly by as part of its victory in Congress 
slipped away via executive order. First, Republicans in the Senate attempted to 
block implementation of the Executive Order by amending a Defense 
Department supplemental appropriations bill. Ironically, in a congressional 
battle reminiscent of the defeat of the Workplace Fairness Act, the legislative 
effort to defeat the Executive Order was thwarted by a Democrat-led filibuster, 
which forced withdrawal of the proposed amendment when the supporters of 
the legislation fell two votes short of invoking cloture.13 
Failing to defeat the Executive Order in Congress, a business coalition that 
very day filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, seeking a temporary injunction and declaratory relief prohibiting the 
(Feb. 14, 1994); Unions: Trumka Says to Leadership of AFL-CIO It's nme to "Either Lead 
or Follow,,. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 62 (Mar. 31, 1995). President Clinton's issuance 
of Executive Order 12,954 is perhaps, in part, an effort to repair damaged relations with 
organized labor resulting from the defeat of the Workplace Fairness Act. See Auto Workers: 
Qinton Tells Union Delegates He Will Fight Repeal of Executive Order, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 113 (June 13, 1995). 
9 Exec. Order No. 12,954, § 1, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023. 
IO The Secretary of Labor delegated his authority under the Order to the Assistant 
Secretary for the American Workplace. Sec. Order No. 2-95, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,602 (1995). 
11 Exec. Order No. 12,954, § 2, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023. The Order and regulations 
promulgated thereunder apply only to federal contracts in excess of one hundred thousand 
dollars. Permanent Replacement of Lawfully Striking Employees by Federal Contractors, 
60 Fed. Reg. 27,855, 27,861 (1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. ch. II and pt. 270) 
[hereinafter Permanent Replacement]. 
12 Exec. Order No. 12,954, §§ 3-4, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023-24; Permanent 
Replacement, supra note 11, §§ 270.12 (authorizing the Secretary to find that debarment or 
termination for convenience is appropriate), 270.14 (setting out procedures for termination 
of contract for convenience), 270.15 (setting out procedures for debarment). 
13 Striker Replacements: Senate Democrats Keep Qinton Order Alive; 
Bridgestone/Firestone Seeks Relief in C.oun, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51 (Mar. 16, 
1995). 
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administration or enforcement of the Executive Order.14 In May 1995, the 
court ruled that the case was not ripe for review and that the plaintiffs failed to 
establish that they were entitled to a preliminary injunction to avoid irreparable 
harm. is The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia denied the appellants' motion to stay enforcement of the Executive 
Order but agreed to expedite the appeaI.16 The appellate court then reversed the 
district court's order and remanded the case for expedited review.17 With the 
judicial challenge to the Executive Order resuscitated, the Labor Department 
initiated an investigation of one of the plaintiffs in the litigation­
Bridgestone/Firestone, 18 which hired a reported 2300 replacement workers for 
employees participating in a United Rubber Workers' strike.19 The Department 
later was enjoined, however, from enforcing the Executive Order. On remand 
of Chamber of Commerce v. Reich from the court of appeals, the district court, 
although holding that the plaintiffs' challenge of the Executive Order failed, 
concluded that an injunction against enforcement was warranted pending appeal 
of the district court's decision .2° The Department of Labor's subsequent motion 
14 [d. 
15 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 886 F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C.) (order denying 
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and for summary judgment and granting 
defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment), rev'd, 57 F.3d 
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
16 Reich, 51 F.Jd at 1 100. 
l7 Id. at 1 101. The court held that the case satisfied the two-pronged test for ripeness 
established in Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The court held that the case 
satisfied the fitness requirement because it involved "purely legal questions," the Secretary 
of Labor had promulgated final regulations under the Executive Order after the district 
court issued its order dismissing the case, and regardless of whether the Order and 
regulations ultimately result in the termination of any contracts or debarment of any 
contractors, the "existence of the Order alters the balance of bargaining power between 
employers and employees." Id. at 1100. The court elaborated on this last point in its 
discussion of the second prong-hardship: "[T)he Order confronts employers with the 
difficult choice between surrendering their right to hire permanent replacements and risking 
the !OM of current and future government contracts." Id. at 1101. 
18 Letter from Charles Richards, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the American 
Workplace, to Masatoshi Ono, Chief Executive Officer of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (June 
26, 1995); see also Defendant's Supplemental Filing, Chamber of C ommerce v. Reich, 886 
F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C. 19Q5) (No. 95-0503) (filing of final regulations and submission of 
letter sent to Bridgestone/Firestone). The letter and supplemental filing are reprinted in 
Labor Dept. Le11er, Cowt Papers on Bridgestone/Firestone Dispute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 125 (June 29, 1995). 
19 Striker Replacemenr: Bridgestone Said Example of Company that Executi ve Order 
Could Ajfea, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46 (March 9, 1995). 
20 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 897 F. Supp. 570 (D.D.C. 1995). The court first 
held that the President's issuance of the Executive Order was not subject to judicial review 
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to vacate the injunction proved unavailing, as the district court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction because a notice of appeal had been filed. 21 
While the judicial challenge to the Executive Order remained alive, a 
further legislative effort to thwart enforcement failed. On September 28, 1995, 
Democrats again employed the filibuster22 to prevent a vote on the Senate floor 
on the Labor Department's 1996 spending bill, which had a rider attached that 
would have prohibited the Department from expending funds to implement the 
Executive Order.23 Thus, while the battle over Executive Order 12,954 appears 
to be over on the legislative front, it continues in the judicial arena, where it 
eventually may be decided by the Supreme Court. 
Regardless of the outcome of the challenge to the Executive Order, the 
recent battles between organized labor and business over permanent 
replacement of strikers indicate that the war is not over. The near passage of 
the Workplace Fairness Act in 1994, and the issuance of Executive Order 
12,954 in 1995, suggest that no matter how hard the business camp fights to 
preserve the Mackay doctrine, it will not be preserved inviolate. Many 
commentators have proposed reforms of striker replacement law that fall 
somewhere along the spectrum between a ban on hiring of permanent 
replacements (a complete reversal of Mackay) and an unyielding preservation of 
Mackay.24 
under Dalton v. Spector, 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994). Reich, 897 F. Supp. at 574-n. 
Acknowledging that the parameters of Dalton are not yet defined and that the case before it 
was likely to go to the Supreme Court, the district court went on to address the merits of the 
legal i.&Qies and to decide the case in favor of the defendant. Id. at 573, 576-77. On the 
merits, the district court first held that the Executive Order was authoriz.ed under the 
Federctl Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1988). 
Reich, 987 F. Supp. at 577-81. The court then held that that Executive Order was not 
subject to the preemption doctrine under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 581-84. 
After deciding that under Dalton the case must be dismissed, the court turned to the issue of 
an injunction pending appeal. Focusing on the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence 
of an injunction, the court quoted from the court of appeals' decision regarding the dilemma 
enforcement would present plaintiffs of surrendering the right to hire permanent 
replacements or risking the loss of government contracts. Id. at 585. Accordingly, the court 
granted an injunction pending appeal of its decision. Id. 
21 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2269 (D.D.C. 1995). 
22 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
23 Striker ReplacemenJs: SenaJe Democrats Block Labor, HHS Bill, Demonrtrating 
Support for Striker Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189 (Sept. 29, 1995). 
24 E.g., Corbett, supra note 7, at 886-95; Charles B. Craver, "/he National Labor 
Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARlz. L. REv. 397, 
423 (1992); Samuel Estreicher, C:Ollective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?: Reflections 
on Anlistrikebreaker Legislation, 93 MlcH. L. REV. 577, 601-08 (1994); Douglas E. Ray, 
Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement Issue, 41 KAN. L. REv. 363, 400 
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One of the most recent entries among the proposals to reform striker 
replacement law is that of Professors Leonard Bierman and Rafael Gely. They 
recommend overturning Mackay, initially prohibiting employers from hiring 
permanent replacements, and making that issue a mandatory bargaining topic. 25 
It may seem ironic to speak of weapons and shootings in a reply to Bierman 
and Gely's proposal to resolve the volatile issue of striker replacement through 
collective bargaining. There are two reasons why I use such terms, however. 
First, Bierman and Gely's proposal is not just about resolving the permanent 
replacement of strikers through bargaining; it begins by taking the employer's 
principal economic weapon and allowing the union to keep its own weapon. 
Second, war and battle terminology has long provided the metaphors of choice 
to describe disagreements between employers and organized labor under the 
National Labor Relations Act. 26 With that preface, I begin with an allegorical 
rendering of Bierman and Gely's proposal and my objections to it.27 
II. TAKING THE EMPLOYER'S GUN AND PUITING IT ON THE TABLE: AN 
ALLEGORY 
The Sheriff has been in town for some time and has seen a number of 
bloody gunfights between the two old gunslingers, Employer and Union.28 He 
(1992); George S. Roulcis & Mamdouh I. Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent 
Striker Replacement Strategy, 44 LAB. L. J. 80, 89-91 (1993); Deborah Eberts, Comment, 
The Mackay Doctrine: The Grand Dame of Labor Law Qashes with the Current State of the 
Unio n, 51 I. AIR L. & COM. 257 (1991); Hal K. Gillespie, Comment, The Mackay 
Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessi.ty, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782, 782-87 (1972); John G. 
McDonald, Note, Leveling the Playing Field or Tipping the Scales? Pending Strike 
Legisla tion: The Latest Battlefield Between Labor and Manage ment-An Alternative 
Solution, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 971, 991-94 (1991); Note, One Strike and You're Out? 
Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REv. 669, 670 
(1993) [hereinafter Note, One Strike]; Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike: A Critique 
and a Proposal for Oumge, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 988, 1009-11 (1971). 
25 Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Eco nomics, a nd  
Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 363 (1995). 
26 See, e.g.' DoUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS 
AND POLICY ch. 3 (3d ed. 1992) (Chapter three is entitled "Economic Weapons"); Julius G. 
Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 
102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1825 (1993) ("The modem strike is  often described as industrial 
warfare. The modem strike, like modem warfare, is likely to involve many battles and a 
variety of theaters of operation."). 
27 Characteristic of the genre, this allegory oversimplifies the issues, but it is a useful 
beginning point in this critique of Bierman and Gely's proposal. 
28 I borrow the gun metaphor for the employer's Mackay right to hire permanent 
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decides that something has to be done to end the bloodshed. He steps between 
Union and Employer and tells Employer to hand over his gun. Employer looks 
stunned. "Is he going to tum his29 in, too?" Employer asks, pointing at Union. 
"No, he isn't," responds the Sheriff. 
"Then why should I turn mine in? Don't you think he'll shoot me if he has 
a gun and I don't?" snorts Employer as he clutches the handle of his six­
shooter. 
"No, Union will not shoot you if you tum in your gun. You're going to 
have to turn it in. Union thinks you shoot his poople3° too often when they 
shoot at you," explains the Sheriff. 
"I don't see how I can be sure he won't shoot me if I turn in my gun," 
protests Employer. 
"Oh, didn't I mention that you may get your gun back? After you turn it 
in, we're going to put it on this table, and you and Union are going to sit down 
and bargain about whether Union will give it back to you," explains the 
Sheriff. 
Employer laughs aloud. "Why would he give me my gun back?" 
"He might, if you are willing to pay him enough for it," explains the 
Sheriff. 
"You really think he would sell me my gun back, knowing I could shoot 
his poop le with it?" asks Employer. 
"Yes, I think he might if the price were right. I'll advise him so that he 
will see the wisdom of selling it back to you under certain circumstances. Now 
you sit down and talk with Union!" demands the Sheriff as he pulls the six­
shooter from Employer's holster. Employer is apprehensive about bargaining 
with Union without his gun, but the Sheriff has laid down the new law. 
Union and Employer begin bargaining. Employer mentions that he would 
replacements for economic strikers from Professor Pollitt: "What was a loaded pistol 
waiting to be fired in 1938, and thereafter for a number of years, is now used with a 
vengeance, and the victims are the promises of the NLRA." Pollitt, supra note 4, at 311. 
29 Although some may object to my calling the right to strike a gun, most would admit 
that the strike is the union's principal economic weapon and it is capable of inflicting harm 
on the employer. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 387. For purposes of this 
metaphorical rendering, I will symbolize both the employees' right to strike and the 
employer's right to hire permanent replacements as guns; however, I will leave open the 
question of whether the employees' right to strike is as large and as powerful a gun as the 
employer's right to hire pennanent replacements. For argument that the Mackay right 
enables employers to inflict far greater injury on employees than the right to strike enables 
employees to inflict on employers, see Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacements: A Labor 
Union Perspective, in PROCEED� OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD .ANNuAL NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON LABoR 23, 43-46 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990). 
JO u . . hired b ruon lS y many of the townspeople to protect them from Employer. 
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like to buy back his gun. The moment he says that, Union reaches down and 
taps his fingers on the gun protruding from his holster. Employer wipes the 
sweat from his brow, asks Union to calm down, and they continue talking. 
There are several issues on which they do not agree, and each time a 
disagreement develops, Union slowly, deliberately touches his holstered gun. 
Employer reaches down and feels his empty holster. 
Employer again asks whether Union will sell him the gun. He wants it 
back very badly because he feels inexplicably vulnerable under these 
circumstances. Union laughs and suggests that it will cost a lot. Employer says 
he is willing to pay a lot. The Sheriff steps forward and whispers something to 
Union.31 After listening to the Sheriff, Union says to Employer, "Of course, if 
I sell you your gun back, I will only give you enough bullets to shoot some of 
my people, and I will choose which ones you can shoot at." At that, Union's 
people, who have been calmly watching their hired gun bargaining for them 
until now, become visibly nervous. One of them yells, "Don't let him shoot 
me, Union!" Another jumps to his feet and demands, "Don't let him shoot 
me!" Still another screams, "Remember, Union, we pay you to protect us!" A 
fight breaks out among Union's people. 
Union, annoyed by the dissension he has created in his ranks by following 
the Sheriff's advice, screams back: "Sit down and shut up back there. I'm 
doing the best I can. If you don't like it, sue me. "32 
Employer is very worried now. The clashes among Union's people have so 
agitated Union that he appears ready to go for his gun and shoot Employer in 
an effort to reunify them. "Well, the ones I would need to shoot to protect 
myself would be that group over there. I will pay a lot to get my gun back and 
get enough bullets to shoot them," offers Employer. 
The Sheriff shakes his head and steps forward and whispers something else 
to Union.33 Union turns suddenly and angrily tells the Sheriff to stay out of 
3l He is telling Union that he can bargain away, for the right price, the right to shoot 
some of the people Union represents, but not others. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 
392 ("[T]here is nothing wrong [no breach of the duty of fair representation] with having a 
union negotiate a contract provision that is designed to reward the expectations of a group 
of employees already within the bargaining unit, even if the union ignores the interests of 
other employees within the same unit."); id. at 388 ("Our proposal will also allow the union 
and the employer, themselves, to make a distinction between the skill level of their workers 
. . . . "). 
32 Unions would be unlikely to lose breach of the duty of fair representation lawsuits 
based on bargaining for different permanent replacement rights for different groups of 
employees. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 391-93. 
33 He is telling Union that these people (those with firm-specific skills) are precisely 
the ones who need to be protected against Employer's opportunistic behavior. Bierman & 
Gely, supra note 25, at 378-79. According to the Sheriff, Union should not bargain away 
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Union's business. 
How does the bargaining end? The most likely ending is that Union and 
Employer cannot agree about the gun or some other matter. Union threatens to 
go for his gun uni� Employer agrees to his terms. "If you do, I'll . . . . " 
stammers Employer. 
"You'll do what?" laughs Union. 
Employer may have some other weapon-a knife, perhaps. 34 Is Employer 
willing to risk a fight without his gun? Maybe. If so, Union draws his gun and 
shoots Employer. Employer, wounded, reaches for his knife, if he has one. 
Although. the outcome of this fight depends on many things, including how 
skillful Employer is with his knife and how skillful Union is with his gun, 
Union probably has the advantage. Employer probably agrees to Union's 
demands to save himself. 
ill. ANALYSIS OF" A LAW, EcONOMICS, AND NEGOTIATIONS 
APPROACH" TO STRIKER REPLACEMENT LAW 
Professors Bierman and Gely and I agree on one major point: the current 
law regarding permanent replacement of strikers should be reformed in a way 
that limits employers' ability to engage in opportunistic behavior. We disagree, 
however, on how that should be done. I would preserve the Mackay doctrine 
but restrict it with procedural limitations. 35 In contrast, the first step in 
Bierman and Gely's proposal is to overturn Mackay. 
I also agree with Bierman and Gely that collective bargaining offers a way 
in which the parties themselves might resolve whether the employer retains the 
right to hire permanent replacements for strikers. I disagree with them, 
however, that no meaningful bargaining can take place on that issue until 
Mackay is overruled and the initial entitlement is shifted. Unions and 
their protection against being shot. 
34 This weapon represents the hiring of temporary replacements, operating with 
nonstriking bargaining unit personnel, moving supervisors to the strikers' positions, and 
other steps to maintain operations during a strike. See CHARLl!S R. PERRY ET AL., 
OPE.RATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB Poucms, AND 
GoVE.RNMENTAL RooULATIONS 51-68 (1982); Finkin, supra note 4, at 562. Although these 
weapons may enable the employer to endure a strike, they are not depicted here as guns 
because they do not inflict the kind of harm on the striking employees that permanent 
replacement does, and they do not endanger the future of the bargaining relationship. 
35 See Corbett, supra note 7, at 886. My proposal for reform of striker replacement 
law also advocates taking the gun from the employer, at least temporarily. My proposal 
does not, h owever, leave it to the union to determine whether the employer gets the gun 
back; it leaves that determination to the National Labor Relations Board, its administrative 
law judges, and its regional offices. Id. at 886-95. 
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employers can bargain on the issue of permanent replacement under current 
law; there is nothing preventing parties from agreeing to a provision of a 
collective bargaining agreement limiting or prohibiting an employer's hiring of 
permanent replacements for strikers. 
Bierman and Gely also argue that the law governing striker replacement 
should distinguish between employees who have made firm-specific 
investments and those who have not. 36 Their proposal calls for unions to 
differentially protect employees in collective bargaining in accordance with that 
distinction. 37 Even if unionS could make the distinctions as Bierman and Gely 
argue, I do not think that most unions would or should adopt such a bargaining 
strategy. 38 
Generally, I disagree with Bierman and Gely's proposal because I think it 
is theoretically unsound, and it would not function in practice as they posit. 
The following sections set forth my specific disagreements with their proposal. 
A. Failure to Recogniz.e or Appreciate Significant Limitations Imposed 
on Employers' Use of Pennanent Replacements Under Current Law 
Bierman and Gely want the law governing permanent replacement of 
strikers to produce efficient results. Professors Cohen and Wachter argue that 
the current law does that. 39 They see the Mackay doctrine as playing a vital 
role in preventing opportunistic behavior by both unions and employers. 40 
Bierman and Gely challenge them on part of this proposition, arguing that the 
current law does not impose sufficient limits on opportunistic behavior by 
employers. 41 
While I agree with Bierman and Gely that the current law needs to be 
reformed to impose more restrictions on employers' opportunistic behavior, 
they fail to recognize or appreciate some of the limitations that the current law 
does impose. Bierman and Gely attack Cohen and Wachter's argument that the 
external labor market limits opportunistic behavior by employers because 
employers will find it difficult to hire permanent replacements at below-market 
wages and because replacements would be reluctant to make firm-specific 
36 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 374, 378-80. 
37 Id. at 383 ("mf courts or Congress make the decision of whether to hire striker 
replacements a mandatory issue of bargaining, unions and employers could make the 
distinction between firm-specific and general investments made by workers . . . .  "). 
38 See infra part ill.D. 
39 George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Repladng Striking Workers: 1he Law 
and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OP NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNuAL 
NATK>NAL CONFERENCE ON LABoR, supra note 29, at 109, 111. 
40 Id. at 118. 
41 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 374-78. 
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investments in firms that develop a reputation for behaving opportunistically.42 
Although Biennan and Gely argue persuasively on this point, they fail to 
recognize or appreciate the significance of Cohen and Wachter's identification 
of deterrents to employers' opportunistic behavior in not only these external 
labor market checks, but also in "Court and board rulings [that] improv[e] the 
likelihood of efficient outcomes. "43 Stated differently, Mackay does not 
conmtute all of the law on the hiring of permanent replacements for striking 
employees. Although Mackay favors employers, other decisions of the 
Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Board favor employees by 
restricting Mackay in various ways. 
Cohen and Wachter discuss three Supreme Court decisions and one 
National Labor Relations Board decision that limit Mackay: NlllB v. Erie 
Resistor Ccrp. 44 (prohibiting employers from offering superseniority to strike 
crossovers); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. 45 and NLRB v. Laidlaw Corp. 46 
(enforcing the reinstatement rights of permanently replaced strikers); and NLRB 
v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 47 (affirming the NLRB's decision to adopt 
no presumption regarding permanent replacements' support for, or opposition 
to, an incumbent union). In addition to those cases, many decisions of the 
National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts of appeals have made it 
more difficult for employers to hire permanent replacements for strikers and 
retain them after the strike and to displace an incumbent union through such a 
strategy. 48 
42 Id. at 375; see also Note, One Strike, supra note 24, at 678 n.51 ("Wachter and 
Cohen miss the fundamental point that unorganized labor, because of informational 
imperfections and mobility deficiencies . . . are unable to accurately assess the tf1U! 
competitive market wage rate."). 
43 Cohen & Wachter, supra note 39, at 1 17. 
44 373 U.S. 221 (1963). 
45 389 U.S. 375 (1967). 
46 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 920 (1970). 
47 494 u.s. n5 (1990). 
48 Consider, for example, the following principles that favor the striking employees 
and the· unions by making it risky for employers to hire permanent replacements. The 
burden is on the employer to prove that it has hired permanent replacements. See, e.g. , 
Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1290 (1993), enforcement denied in part, 53 
F.Jd 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Ambiguity iii the wording of replacement offers is construed 
again& the employer. See, e.g. , Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741 (1986), review 
denied, 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 845 (1987). The most important 
limitation on Mackay is that employers may hire permanent replacements for only economic 
strikers; the Mackay right to hire permanent replacements does not apply to unfair labor 
practice strikes. Ray, supra note 24, at 368. Unions almost always contend that strikes are 
unfair labor practice strikes, and the standards for detennining the characterization of a 
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There is another limitation imposed on employers' potential opportunistic 
behavior by the internal labor market. The employees that Bierman and Gely 
argue should be protected from permanent replacement are those who have 
made investments in firm-specific training. As Bierman and Gely note, the very 
characteristic that could make these employees targets of opportunistic 
behavior, their firm-specific skills, also provides them protection against such 
conduct. They are the employees that the employer would have the most 
difficulty replacing because the replacements must be trained, and that training 
involves both cost and time. 49 
strike favor unions and the striking employees. A strike is classified as an unfair labor 
practice strike if it was "caused in who le or in part by an employer's unfair labor 
practices." Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989). A strike 
that begins as an economic strike is converted into an unfair labor practice strike if an 
employer's unfair labor practice is a factor in prolonging the strike. See , e.g., C-Line 
Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989). The Board treats some types of unfair labor 
practices as resulting in per se conversion of an economic strike into an unfair labor practice 
strike without even considering the subjective evidence to determine whether the striking 
employees considered the unfair labor practice a cause of the strike. Id. Suppose an 
employer, concluding that it lawfully could hire permanent replacements and that it in fact 
has done so, denies reinstatement to striking employees who offer to return to work. If the 
employer's conclusions are later determined to be incorrect by the NLRB (and perhaps a 
court of appeals), the employer will be held liable for potentially large back pay and other 
make-whole relief. See Corbett, supra note 7, at 848-50. See generally Dennis 0. Lynch, 
Deferral,, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to C.Ontract and Back 
Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 302 n.346 (1989) ("When a union strikes, the employer 
can hire replacements and the employees may be forced to seek employment elsewhere, but 
NLRA obligations create very high transaction costs which severely restrict the employer's 
ability to seek employees outside of the members of the certified unit."). 
49 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 379-80. Many other commentators have 
recogniz.ed this principle. See, e.g. , Douglas L. Leslie, Re telling the International, Paper 
Story, 102 YALE L.J. 1897, 1898-99 (1993) ("Unions win strikes for a number of 
reasons . • . .  [M]ost importantly, a union can win a strike if the workers possess skills and 
knowledge that are specific to the firm or the industry, so that managers cannot replace 
them with newcomers, at least in the short run."); see also Douglas L. Leslie, Labor 
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REv. 353, 358 (1984) (explaining that firms may incur heavy 
costs when an employee with firm-specific skills leaves the firm because costs of training a 
replacement "are directly proportional to the firm-specific knowledge or skills of the exiting 
employee"); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of 
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction to the Proble ms of Subcontracting, Partial Oosure, 
and RelocaJion, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1358 (1988) (observing that, because workers 
with job-specific training have a productivity advantage over workers without such training, 
the replacement labor pool is diminished). 
A corollary to the difficulty of replacing employees with firm-specific training is that 
mployers may most need to be able to offer permanent status in order to attract 
eplacements to those positions. Potential replacements may be reluctant to invest in firm-
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Thus, Bierman and Gely underestimate the limitations imposed on 
employers' right to permanently replace strikers under current law. Explaining 
the inadequacy of two of the limitations identified by Cohen and Wachter is not 
a full treatment of the restrictions currently imposed on the Mackay doctrine. 
Although more restrictions are needed to deter opportunistic behavior by 
employers, the extreme reform Bierman and Gely recommend, overruling 
Mackay, is not necessary. Indeed, that first step in Bierman and Gely's 
proposal brings them to the second part of Cohen and Wachter's theory on the 
efficiency of the Mackay doctrine: it.deters opportunistic behavior by unions. If 
Mackay were overruled, what would deter unions from the opportunistic 
behavior of making demands that would impose substantial hardship on 
employers and calling strikes to obtain their demands? Bierman and Gely's 
failure to answer that question demonstrates why the first step in their proposal 
is unwise. 
B. Failure to Propose an Effective Restriction on Opportunistic Behavior 
by Unions to Replace the Mackay Doctrine 
Bierman and Gely recognize that overruling Mackay increases the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior by unions and employees. 5o Some 
commentators postulate that, if employers were prohibited from hiring 
permanent replacements, unions would be quicker to call strikes,51 and, 
because strikes would involve a substantially reduced risk, unions would call 
strikes to obtain excessive demands.52 If Mackay were overruled as Bierman 
specific training if the job offer is for no more than the duration of a strike. On the 
diminution of the substitute labor pool if  employers were limited to hiring temporary 
replacements, see Michael H. LeRoy, Oumging Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker 
Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert, and Cartelil.Q/i.on, 34 B.C. L. REv. 257, 
305 (1993). 
50 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 370 ("[I)f the Mackay doctrine was overturned 
and unions were given total protection against the hiring of permanent replacements, 
employers might well be subject to some form of opportunistic behavior on the part of 
unions."); id. at 382 ("[T)he American Airlines scenario also illustrates the opportunistic 
leverage potentially open to unions if the Mackay doctrine is simply overturned without 
more."); id. at 387 ("[I)f unions are allowed to strike knowing that their members cannot be 
permanently replaced, they will be free to engage in strikes and in that way expropriate 
rents due to the employer under their agreement."). 
51 E.g., Brendan Dolan, Mackay Radio: !f It Jsn 't Broken, Don't Fix It, 25 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 313, 317 (1991). 
52 E.g., David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Owice, 7 
LAB. LAW. 137, 146 (1991). 
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and Gely propose, what would deter union8 from engaging in such 
opportunistic behavior? I find no satisfactory answer in their article. 
Bierman and Gely suggest that the second step of their proposal, making 
permanent replacement a mandatory bargaining topic, would deter unions from 
acting opportunistically. I disagree. That step would not provide employers any 
protection against opportunistic behavior by unions. One consequence of an 
issue being labelled a mandatory topic is that if either party wishes to bargain 
about it, the parties have a duty to bargain in good faith about that topic. s3 
Thus, under Bierman and Gely's proposal, an employer could insist that a 
union bargain with it on the issue of permanent replacement, and the union 
would be required to do so. A second ramification of a topic being classified as 
a mandatory topic, however, is that either party can insist upon its position on 
that issue to impasse and use economic force in support of its position. 54 Thus, 
under Bierman and Gely's proposal, a union could maintain its position on 
striker replacement (or any other mandatory topic) and back it up with a strike. 
Because Bierman and Gely's first step was to shift the rule and prohibit 
permanent replacement, the employer could not hire permanent replacements 
during such a strike. Ironically then, the second step of Bierman and Gely's 
proposal, adding a contentious topic to those mandatory topics on which unions 
can strike, actually could exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the increased 
potential for opportunistic behavior by unions under their proposal . 55 
Bierman and Gely's answer to this challenge seems to be that unions will 
bargain on this issue toward "mutual gain by exchange"56 if the initial rule is 
set in their favor, whereas employers will not. It is likely that unions would 
bargain about permanent replacement if it were declared a mandatory 
bargaining topic; it would be an unfair labor practice to refuse to do so. The 
pivotal question is whether unions would be willing to make exchanges on this 
issue so that agreements could be achieved; if not, they could call strikes in 
support of their position. Bierman and Gely suggest that the permanent 
53 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); ROBERT 
A. GoRMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABoR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
498 (1976). 
54 GoRMAN, supra note 53, at 498. 
55 I would not object to making permanent replacement a mandatory topic under the 
current striker replacement law. My point is that making it a mandatory topic after 
overturning Mackay would not deter unions' opportunistic behavior. I am skeptical, 
however, that making striker replacement a mandatory topic under current law would 
facilitate bargaining. &e Lynch, supra note 48, at 278-79 (arguing that the 
mandatory/permis&ve distinction may not practically affect the parties when bargaining for 
a collective bargaining agreement). 
56 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 385, 393 (quoting ROBERT CoorER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMICS 6 (1988)). 
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replacement issue is more likely to be resolved by the parties the�lves if the 
initial rule favors the union. 57 The next section explains why their argument on 
this point is unpers�ive. 
C. Effect on Collective Bargaining of Shifting the Default Entitlement to 
Unions 
Why would unions with the default entitlement58 be more likely to bargain 
toward mutual exchange and agreement than employers with the default 
entitlement? First, according to Bierman and Gely, unions would be more 
likely tO bargain to agreement because calling strikes hurts their members. 59 
Second, unions value the right more than employers, and so they should be 
given the opporwnity to exchange it for something they value more highly.60 
Both of these propositions are dubious. 
1 .  Effect of Strike Hardship on Willingness to Call Strikes 
It is true that strikes inflict hardship on striking employees be.cause they 
forego their regular paychecks while on strike.61 It is also true that harming the 
employer by striking ultimately may harm the employees who are dependent on 
the employer for their financial well-being.62 Bierman and Gely's argument 
that these considerations will make unions more likely than employers to 
51 Id. at 387-88. 
58 "Default entitlements" or "default settings" is the term used by Professors Wachter 
and Cohen to denote "entitlements that apply in the absence of a contrary agreement, or in 
the presence of an ambiguous agreement, between contracting parties." Wacht.er & Cohen, 
supra note 49, at 1365. Professor Leslie uses "gap-filling rule" in the same way. l..F.sLm, 
supra note 26, at 426. 
59 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 388 n. 154. This discussion is relevant to which 
party should be assigned the initial entitlement. Professors Wachter and Cohen posit that 
property rule entitlements (things that can be taken only through voluntary purchases, 
Wachter and Cohen, supra note 49, at 1366 n.88) are "relatively efficient" when the default 
entitlement is assigned to the party that values the entitlement more or the party that is less 
likely to use it strategically. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 49, at 1370. Bierman and Gely 
argue that unions, which are reluctant to strike, are less likely to use the default entitlement 
strategically. Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 388 n. 154. 
60 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 387-88. 
61 /d. at 388 n. 154; see also PAUL c. WEILER, GoVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE 
FuruRE OP LABoR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 129 (1990) (describing the strike as a "two­
edged sword"). 
62 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 388 n.154; see also Kamiat, supra note 29, at 
43. 
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bargain toward agreement, however, fails to take into account several 
principles. 
First, although strikes impose hardships on strikers under the current law, 
they still are conducted. Why? Apparently unions and the employees they 
represent think that the bargaining concessions an employer will make to end a 
strike are greater than the hardship imposed on the employees for the duration 
of the strike. If the principal impediment to strikes63 were removed, it is likely 
that unions would be less reluctant to call strikes. Furthermore, although going 
without a paycheck is undeniably painful, the strikers and unions would control 
how long they endure the pain, as the strikers could obtain reinstatement upon 
making unconditional offers to return to work, and the employer would be 
required to reinstate them. 64 
Second, unions are not limited to either calling strikes and causing their 
members to suffer or bargaining with employers and earnestly trying to achieve 
agreements. The threat of a strike (tapping fingers on the holstered gun), with 
the employer prohibited from hiring permanent replacements, might be enough 
to cause an employer to shy away from its demands. 65 Unions, like employers 
under the current law, could act opportunistically by using the threat of 
unchecked economic force to cause employers to accede to unreasonable 
demands.66 
Finally, it does not necessarily follow that, because the employees' future 
economic well-being may depend on the employer, they and their union will 
not make excessive demands and support them with damaging strikes. 67 
Employees and unions, even if provided with information by an employer 
regarding the economic harm that would result from agreeing to their demands, 
may evaluate the information differently than the employer. For example, some 
63 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
64 The employer would be required to reinstate them unless the employer announced a 
lockout at or before the time the strikers made offers to return. Eads Transfer, Inc., 304 
N.L.R.B. 7 1 1 ,  713 (1991), enforced, 989 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1993). 
65 Under the current rule on striker replacement favoring employers, some employers 
use the threat of permanent replacement to exercise leverage at the bargaining table. See 
Ray, supra note 24, at 365. Some employers also use the threat of hiring permanent 
replacements to end strikes without ever actually hiring permanent replacements. See 
CHARLF.S S. Lc>uGHRAN, NEGOTIATING A l.AooR CONTRACT: A MANAGEMENT llANDBooK 
430 (2d ed. 1992) (describing a threat to hire permanent replacements as "a powerful 
incentive to motivate union negotiators to seek a settlement before or during a strike"); see 
also Corbett, supra note 7, at 815-26 (describing the effect of Caterpillar's threat of 
permanent replacement on the UAW's strike in 1991-92). 
66 Lynch, supra note 48, at 302 (discussing both parties' use of threats and lies to gain 
the terms they want). 
67 Westfall, supra note 52, at 147 (asserting that a "vast leap of faith" is required to 
conclude that such a realiz.ation is a sufficient deterrent). 
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employees may be concerned with the financial stability and competitiveness of 
the employer only in the short tenn, after which their own financial well-being 
may no longer depend on the employer. 
2. Default Entitlement-Unions or F.mployers? 
a. Cu"ent Law Does Not Prevent Parties From Contracting Around the 
Default Entitlement (But They Do Not) 
Bierman and Gely observe that it is paradoxical that none of the previous 
proposals to reform striker replacement law have attempted to use the collective 
bargaining process .68 An initial response is that no refonn of the law is 
necessary to make such a solution possible. Although Bierman and Gely are 
correct that no case h� decided whether permanent replacement is a permissive 
or mandatory topic, 69 there is nothing · in the Act or any court or Board 
decision suggesting that it is an illegal topic. 70 Thus, it is at least a permissive 
topic, and the parties could bargain about it if both wished to do so.71 Yet, 
employers and unions typically have not included provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements prohibiting employers from hiring permanent 
replacements for all the members of a collective bargaining unit or for any of 
them.72 Employers have retained the initial entitlement granted by Mackay. 
68 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 384. 
69 Id. at 388-89. 
70 There are three types of bargaining topics: mandatory, permis&ve, and illegal. 
GoRMAN, supra note 53, at 498. 
71 See Lynch, supra note 48, at 291 n.292 ("The right of an employer to permanently 
replace an economic striker under Mackay can be conceptually treated as an entitlement that 
the employer can transfer to the union."); see also 470 Stratford Holding Co. v. Local 32B-
32J, Serv. Employees Int'} Union, 805 F. Supp. 118, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting 
argument that employer had agreed to waive Mackay right under collective bargaining 
agreement, but recognizing that "statutorily-protected right" can be waived by "clear and 
unmistakable" agreement). 
72 See 2 BUREAU OP NAT'L AFFAIRS, COLLECTNE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND 
CONTRACTS ch. n (discUMing and giving examples of basic patterns for contract terms 
regarding strikes and lockouts; no clause prohibiting the hiring of permanent replacements 
is included). 
In some cases arbitrators, even in the absence of an express provision prohibiting 
employers from hiring permanent replacements, have strained to interpret collective 
bargaining agreements as waiving the employer's Mackay right. See Meyers v. Parex, Inc., 
689 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming arbitrator's award interpreting collective bargaining 
agreement, through interaction of three sections, as waiving the employer's right to 
permanently replace striking employees without notice); Edna H. Pagel, Inc. v. Teamsters 
Local Union 595, 667 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming arbitrator's award interpreting 
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Why have the parties themselves not negotiated such clauses? Bierman and 
Gely answer that the employer has no incentive to bargain on this issue 
"because any negotiation will by definition make the employer worse off. "73 
Do they mean to say that employers value the right to hire permanent 
replacements so highly that they are unwilling to sell it to unions at any price? 
It is inconsistent for Bierman and Gely to assert that employers value the right 
so much that they will not bargain about exchanging it and also to assert that 
unions value the right more highly than employers, but giving them the default 
entitlement will facilitate bargaining because they will be willing "to exchange 
the protection against permanent replacements for other bargaining demands 
they might value more highly. "74 The fact that employers do not bargain away 
the initial entitlement indicates that they value the right more highly than 
unions. 
b. Why Shou'/d the Default Entitlement Be Shifted? 
Bierman and Gely root their proposal for reforming striker replacement 
law in the law and economics objective of achieving efficiency in collective 
bargaining. 75 In view of that objective, they should explain why shifting the 
default entitlement to unions will produce efficient results. They assert that, in 
the presence of transaction costs, bargaining structure matters and the initial 
allocation of rights will affect the likelihood of successful bargaining. 76 Which 
party should be favored by the initial entitlement in order to facilitate 
bargaining for mutual exchange and efficient results? Unions, say Bierman and 
Gely. Why? Because, they assert, unions value the right more than 
employers .77 The lack of analysis supporting this assertion calls its validity into 
question. 
An initial assumption that Bierman and Gely make regarding application of 
clause prohibiting discharge for picketing or honoring picket lines as precluding permanent 
replacement of striking employees). But see 470 Stratford Holding Co. , 805 F. Supp. at 1 26 
("[f)he fact that a collective bargaining agreement includes a justifiable discharge provision 
in no way indicates that the employer waived his statutorily-protected right to hire 
permanent replacement workers. ").  
73 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 387; see also id. at 393 ("[U]nder the current 
scheme of things, there is almost no incentive for employers to bargain with respect to this 
issue."). 
74 Id. at 388. 
15 See id. at 384-88 (describing the opportunity for "mutual gain by exchange"); id. at 
366 (disagreeing with Wachter and Cohen on efficiency of the Mackay doctrine and styling 
their proposal a "remedy [to) this problem"). 
76 Id. at 386. 
77 Id. at 387-88. 
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the Coase Theorem78 to collective bargaining merits some attention. They 
cwwne that transaction costs do affect the efficient allocation of entitlements in 
collective bargaining. According to the Co� Theorem, in the absence of 
transaction costs, parties will reach efficient agreements regardless of which 
party has the initial entitlement. 79 When transaction costs do not affect the 
efficient allocation, the initial entitlement should be allocated in accordance 
with what most parties would agree to if they bargained over the issue, so that 
most parties can rely upon the gap-filler and be spared whatever transaction 
costs are associated with bargaining. 80 Because collective bargaining 
agreements. do not shift the entitlement to the union,81 the initial entitlement 
should be as it is under current law. 
Bierman and Gely assert, however, that transaction costs do interfere with 
the efficient allocation of entitlements in collective bargaining. 82 There is 
disagreement on this matter among commentators.83 If Bierman and Gely are 
correct, however, the presence of transaction costs could explain why collective 
bargaining agreements do not have clauses that prohibit the hiring of permanent 
replacements even if, as Bierman and Gely assert, unions value the right more 
highly than employers.84 Still, one would expect to find some situations in 
78 The theorem was first suggested in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Co.rt, 3 
J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). 
79 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 385; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 56, 
at 101 n. 1 1; Lynch, supra note 48, at 299; Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and 
the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 246, 258 (1987). 
80 l.EsLIE, supra note 26, at 425. 
81 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
82 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 386-87. 
83 Compare l.EsLIE, supra note 26, at 425 (asserting that th.ere are "serious 
transactions costs in labor-management gap-filling") with Schwab, supra note 79, at 266-68 
(contending that transaction costs do not interfere with efficient allocation of entitlement 
when the difference in valuation of entitlement by parties exceeds costs of bargaining, and 
asserting that bargaining costs are lower in labor bargaining than in other contexts) and 
Lynch, supra note 48, at 300 (arguing that transaction costs are close to zero). Professors 
Wachter and Cohen describe Leslie and Schwab as "stak[ing] out polar cases in the debate 
over the trading of entitlements." Wachter & Cohen, supra note 49, at 1366 n.61. Wachter 
and Cohen argue, in their "middle ground" position, that the transaction costs of strategic 
behavior and asymmetric behavior sometimes interfere with the efficient exchange of 
entitlements, but that the parties often overcome those transaction costs and agree to 
efficient contracts. Id. 
84 Professor Leslie uses the term "trivial entitlement" to describe an entitlement for 
which the transaction costs are greater than the gain from obtaining a contractual reversal of 
the default entitlement. LEsLIB, supra note 26, at 426. Leslie's further description of how 
unions would seek to obtain such an entitlement could apply to organized labor's efforts to 
obtain the default entitlement on permanent replacement: 
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which some unions have succeeded in obtaining such clauses through 
bargaining if they value the entitlement more than employers. 85 
Assuming, arguendo, that Bierman and Gely are correct about transaction 
costs interfering with the transfer of entitlements to parties that value them the 
most, with which party, employer or union, should the law place the default 
entitlement regarding permanent replacement? Bierman and Gely state the law 
should do three things: (1) increase the likelihood of successful bargaining; (2) 
minimize transaction costs associated with bargaining; and (3) provide adequate 
enforcement mechanisms when bargaining fails. 86 Apparently guided by those 
objectives, they argue that the default entitlement should be allocated to the 
"union, the party which probably values this right the most. "87 
Assigning the default rule to the party that values it the most is one of the 
approaches advocated by commentators. 88 How do Bierman and Gely conclude 
that unions value the entitlement more highly than employers? They offer no 
support for their conclusion. As Professor Leslie observes, identifying the 
party that values the entitlement more highly "involves more than just a l ittle 
speculation" : it involves identifying the benefits to the parties from engaging in 
the conduct, and "the risks of unforeseen events and strategic behavior. "89 
Considering the bargaining leverage that the permanent replacement entitlement 
gives to the party that has it initially90 and the potential for strategic behavior 
It is consistent with the value of a gap-filling rule being trivial that there is 
substantial lobbying with the Board, courts, or the legislature, for a reversal of the rule. 
The value of a particular right when summed across all [effected] unions might be 
substantial, and so the AFL-CIO or [effected] international unions might do the 
lobbying. Moreover, the value of a particular rule may be low because the probability 
(ex ante) of its invocation is low, although once the event triggering the rule has 
occurred, the (ex post) value of the rule may warrant litigation by the parties affected. 
Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). Although the consequences of permanent replacement can be 
devastating when actually invoked , see, e.g. , Michael Arndt, Casualties Rise in Strike War 
Walkout Losers, Employers Spar over Crucial Bill, CHI. TRIB., June 13,  1994, § 4, at 1 ,  it is 
rarely implemented by employers. The U.S. General Accounting Office estimates that 
employers actually hired permanent replacements in about seventeen percent of the strikes 
in 1985 and 1989. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNflNG OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: 
STRIKF.S AND THE USE OP PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN THE 1970s AND 1980s, 
H.R. Doc. No. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991). 
85 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
86 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 385. 
87 Id. at 387-88 (footnote omitted). 
88 LEsLIE, supra note 26, at 43 1 ;  Schwab, supra note 79, at 287 ("In a world of costly 
transactions, efficiency is promoted by awarding an entitlement to the party who values it 
most highly and would have obtained it but for the transaction costs. "). 
89 LEsLIE, supra note 26, at 432. 
90 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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by that party, I think it is difficult to determine whether generally employers or 
unions value the right more highly. An alternative basis for allocating the 
default entitlement may prove more useful. 
Another basis for selecting the initial entitlement is choosing the setting 
that involves lower transaction costs. 91  Indeed, Bierman and Gely identify this 
choice as one of the roles of the law in providing a framework for 
negotiations. 92 Professor Leslie identifies several transaction costs relevant to 
setting default entitlements in collective bargaining. 93 These transaction costs 
also have been treated as part of the unions' difficulties in valuing an 
entitlement and in justifying to their members an exchange of an entitlement. 94 
Under either treatment, consideration of these factors suggests that shifting the 
default entitlement on permanent replacement to unions would not minimize 
transaction costs and increase the likelihood of successful bargaining-two of 
the goals Bierman and Gely identify for their proposaJ.95 
Leslie uses the term "batch theory" as the name for the situation arising 
out of the fact that terms in collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in 
batches. 96 Because the tradeoffs involved in negotiations may be complex, it 
may be difficult for unions to explain to their members what they got in 
exchange for relinquishing a right initially conferred by law.97 Because of this 
problem, unions that have the default entitlement may refuse to bargain it 
away.98 Consequently, it may be more costly for the parties to move from a 
default rule giving the union the initial entitlement to an agreement transferring 
the entitlement to the employer than vice versa. 99 
A second transaction cost or valuation problem, related to the first, has 
been discussed as the difference in valuation of opportunity cost income and 
realized income100 and a "No Backwards Steps" strategy of unions. 101 The 
91 l....P.sLIE, supra note 26, at 431. 
92 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 389. 
93 l....P.sLIE, supra note 26, at 425-31 .  
94 Lynch, supra note 48, at 300 n.335; see also Schwab, supra note 79, at 275 
(discussing the effect that shifting the default entitlement has on valuation of entitlement). 
95 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 389. 
96 l....P.sLIE, supra note 26, at 426-28. 
97 Id. 
98 Jd. 
99 Id. at 431 & n.26. 
100 Lynch, supra note 48, at 300 n.335, 302-04; Schwab, supra note 79, at 275-77. 
Lynch interprets Leslie's "framing theory" as describing a similar phenomenon. Lynch, 
supra note 48, at 303-04 n.355. Framing theory describes individuals' risk aversion when 
gains are at stake and risk preference when I� are at stake. LF.SLIE, supra note 26, at 
429-30 . 
. 
_ 1°1 Sch�, supra note 79, at 2n (explaining meaning of phrase and noting that it 
ongmated with John L. Lewis). 
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phenomenon described by these terms is that employees will value an 
entitlement that initially belongs to them more highly than they will value the 
same entitlement if it initially belongs to the employer . 102 Consequently, 
unions will charge employers more to purchase the entitlement than unions 
would pay employers for that entitlement. 103 If this result is true, it suggests 
that bargaining to agreement is less likely when the union has the initial 
entitlement than when the employer has it. One aspect of unions as collective 
bargaining representatives and two characteristics of the permanent replacement 
issue suggest that the higher valuation of the initial entitlement (realized 
income) will be exaggerated in the collective bargaining context, with the likely 
result that most unions will not sell the entitlement for any price that employers 
are likely to offer. 
Union leaders must assess not their own differential valuations of realized 
income and opportunity cost income, but that of the bargaining unit members 
whom they represent. 104 Because of the difficulty of this overall assessment, 
union leaders may find it politically expedient to preserve an initial entitlement 
like a prohibition on permanent replacement even if that means achieving lower 
gains in other terms and conditions of the agreement. 1 os 
Selling the right to permanently replace strikers would diminish or 
decimate the ability of a union to mount a successful strike against an 
employer. Groups of employees with respect to whom a union sells an 
employer the right to permanently replace are not likely to go out on strike, 1 06 
nor should the union expect them to do so. 
A second condition peculiar to the permanent replacement issue which is 
likely to increase the union's valuation of the initial entitlement (realized 
income) vis-?l-vis the opportunity cost income is the potential ripple effect of 
selling the entitlement on future negotiations for new collective bargaining 
agreements. If a union sells the entitlement, it is also, to a large extent, selling 
its leverage in future negotiations. Bierman and Gely propose that any 
contractual provision on permanent replacement would survive the expiration 
lOl Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the 
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 , 678-95 (1979); Lynch, supra note 48, at 303-04; 
Schwab , supra note 79, at 276. 
103 Lynch, supra note 48, at 303; Schwab, supra note 79, at 276. 
104 Lynch, supra note 48, at 304. 
105 Id. 
l06 One may argue that under the current law employees strike notwithstanding the 
threat of permanent replacement. Employees perceive no irony, however, that unions call 
on them to strike now under the threat of permanent replacement when employers have the 
initial entitlement. In contrast, employees will not miss the irony of being asked to strike 
under the threat of permanent replacement when the very union advising them to strike sold 
their protection. 
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of the collective bargaining agreement. 107 I agree with them that such a 
requirement would be necessary to make the entitlement to permanently replace 
something that an employer would be interested in purchasing. Most strikes 
occur during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement; 
consequently, the greatest value of a permanent replacement clause to an 
employer would be during negotiations for a new agreement. A corollary to 
this, however, is that a union trades its future leverage for a good collective 
bargaining agreement in the present. Unions will not fail to recognize this 
point, and the likely result is that unions will refuse to sell the entitlement to 
employers at virtually any price. 
In sum, Bierman and Gely's basis for setting the default entitlement on 
permanent replacement in favor of unions is that unions value it more highly 
than employers. They do not support that conclusion, and it would be difficult 
to determine which party d� value the entitlement more highly. In view of 
that difficulty, it might be more useful to allocate the default entitlement 
according to which setting entails lower transaction costs and promotes 
bargaining. At least two significant factors suggest that shifting the initial 
entitlement would not accomplish those objectives. 
D. 1he Bargaining Strategy Advocated by Bierman and Gely 
Bierman and Gely's proposal is designed to make it possible for unions to 
sell the right to permanently replace strikers to employers with respect to some 
employees (those with general skills) but not others (those with firm-specific 
skills). Bierman and Gely recognize that situations exist in which a union 
represents a bargaining unit in which there are both types of employees. 108 
These situations and the bargaining strategy that Bierman and Gely recommend 
as a response to these situations raise problems.109 I think that unions generally 
107 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 3�91. 
108 Id. at 388 (asaerting that their proposal allows employers and unions to distinguish 
between skill levels of employees); id. al 39 1-92 (arguing that unions would not lose breach 
of the duty of fair representation lawsuits as a result of negotiating agreements distinguishing 
between employees with specific skills and those with general skills). 
I09 These problems may be addressed by including firm-specific skills and general 
skilla as community of interest factors in an effort to reduce or eliminate "mixed " units. 
Su, e.g. , GoRMAN, supra note 53, at 68-74 (discussing community of interest factors used 
to determine what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit). Introducing more factors 
about which parties can disagree prior to a representation election, however, could further 
complicate unit determination and further delay employees' opportunity to be represented 
by a labor organization. q Remarks of NLRB Otairman Gould to the Commonwealth Qub, 
San Francisco, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 1  Qune 13, 1994) (decrying wastefulness and 
delay of litigation over appropriate bargaining units and advocating adoption of more 
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would not adopt the bargaining strategy for mixed units advocated by Bierman 
and Gely, and further, I think that they should not do so. 
1. Unions Would Not Adopt the Bargaining Strategy 
First, Bierman and Gely assume that, because an employer would be acting 
opportunistically by permanently replacing employees with furn-specific skills, 
unions, favored with the default entitlement, necessarily would be solicitous of 
protecting those employees. Although some unions might have a singular 
concern for employees with firm-specific skills, unions also have self-interest 
considerations that are significant in shaping their bargaining strategies. One is 
that a union must retain the support of a majority of the bargaining unit 
members lest it risk losing its status as the exclusive bargaining 
representative. 1 10 Furthermore, under many circumstances, bargaining unit 
members are not required to pay dues and fees to a union. 1 1 1  Thus, a union, 
deciding for which employees it would sell the right of permanent replacement 
(if any), may be more concerned with self-preservation than protecting 
employees with firm-specific skills. 
A union's bargaining strategy also must take into account the bargaining 
strategy of the employer. If the union has the default entitlement on permanent 
replacement, the employer's bargaining strategy will emphasize purchasing the 
right to permanently replace which employees? In order to attract replacements 
who will invest in firm-specific skills, employers may find it necessary to offer 
permanent status. 1 12 Employees with general skills who can begin working 
with little or no training are likely to be easier to attract, even if all that 
employers can offer is temporary status. Thus, it is the very employees that 
definitive rules). Furthermore, this new approach to determining bargaining units would 
apply only to new bargaining units. The problems discussed below would continue to arise 
for pre�xisting mixed units. 
1 10 This loss of status could occur through withdrawal of recognition by the employer, 
supported by a good faith doubt in the majority status of the union, or a loss in a 
decertification election or an election in response to an employer's RM petition. See 
generally DouGLAS E. RAY & EMERY w. BARTLE, LABoR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: 
STRIKES, LocKours AND BoYcarrs §§ 8:01-:06 (1992). 
1 1 1  This option depends on whether the particular state has a right-to-work statute, and 
if not, whether the collective bargaining agreement contains a union security clause. See 
generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABoR LAW: THE BoARO, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL 
l..ABoR RELATIONS ACT ch. 27 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., Jd ed. 1992). 
1 12 LeRoy, supra note 49, at 305-06 ("Particularly for employers who rely on a 
skilled workforce, [a prohibition on hiring permanent replacements) would virtually cut off 
the supply of qualified replacement workers: there would be no effective working through 
strikea. ") . 
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Bierman and Gely argue unions should protect for whom employers are likely 
to pay a lot for the right to replace. Will unions sell employers that right? It 
may depend on how much the unions can get for how many of their other 
bargaining unit members. 
2. Unions Should Not Adopt the Bargaining Strategy 
Bierman and Gely assert that unions would not be likely to lose breach of 
the duty of fair representation cases for selling the permanent replacement 
protection with respect to some groups of employees and not others. 1 13 They 
are probably correct on this point. 1 14 I do not think the probability of their 
winning such lawsuits means, however, that they should adopt a bargaining 
strategy of making distinctions among groups of employees within a bargaining 
unit regarding sale of the right to permanently replace. 
To differentiate among employees regarding sale of the right to 
permanently replace would · be extremely divisive, splintering the bargaining 
unit and setting it at war against itself. Of course, unions now negotiate for 
different rates of pay and other differences in terms and conditions for different 
groups of employees within bargaining units. But to do so with permanent 
replacement would be different. This entitlement involves matters of job 
security and ability to strike. 1 15 
N. CONCLUSION 
I agree with Professors Bierman and Gely that the law on striker 
replacement should be reformed. I disagree, however, with the initial step of 
their proposal-taking Employer's gun from him. While that step would 
prevent Employer from shooting Union's people, it also might tempt Union to 
1 13 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 391-93. 
1 14 The Supreme Court has held that; when evaluating a union's performance in 
negotiations, the Court must be "highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that 
negotiators need for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities." Air Line 
Pilots AM'n, Int'! v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991). 
1 15 Consider organii.ed labor's opposition to Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent 
Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). The Supreme Court held that an employer 
did not violate the Railway Labor Act by refusing, at the conclusion of a strike, to replace 
junior strike crossovers with more senior employees who did not cross over. Id. at 432. The 
case illustrates a differentiation among the rights of bargaining unit members which pits 
members against each other on job security, and by creating such rifts, impinges on a 
union's ability to conduct a successful strike. The decision is so vehemently opposed by 
organiz.ed labor that it, along with Mackay, would have been overturned by the Workplace 
Fairness Act. H.R. REP. No. 1 16, 103d Cong., lst Sess.,  pt. 1 ,  at l ,  2, 39 (1993). 
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shoot Employer, and Bierman and Gely do not explain how their law would 
prevent that. They do not recognize that there already are several laws that 
discourage Employer from shooting up the town and that some other laws can 
be made which would further discourage Employer without taking his gun and 
leaving him at the mercy of Union. Bierman and Gely are confident that Union 
would not shoot Employer. I think that is a naive view of how the two old 
gunslingers are likely to act. 
Bierman and Gely think that Union would negotiate with Employer about 
selling back his gun to him. They do not appreciate Union's apprehension 
about explaining to his people why he sold the gun back to Employer. Besides, 
if Union sells it back to him, Union and his people can expect Employer to 
come to the next meeting with it loaded. 
Finally, Union cannot bargain with Employer the way Bierman and Gely 
want him to. If he did, his people would tum on each other, and when he 
needed them to fight with Employer, many of them would not be willing to put 
their lives on the line. And who could blame them if Union were willing to 
sacrifice some of them? 
